[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_rZjCmUBEHftE91DeNru5KqLSSaOmvYzpnCjBdzKdLqM.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000182","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/21\/essays\/183\/repeal-of-prohibition\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ERepeal of Prohibition\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n Amendment XXI\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESection 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESection 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESection 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWhen the nation repealed Prohibition by\u0026nbsp;means of the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933,\u0026nbsp;it vested primary control over alcoholic beverages\u0026nbsp;in the states. The common understanding of the\u0026nbsp;framers of the Twenty-first Amendment was that\u0026nbsp;it grants each state the power to regulate alcoholic\u0026nbsp;beverages within its borders without intrusion by\u0026nbsp;federal law or regulation. The question remains,\u0026nbsp;however, as to how much and what kind of federal\u0026nbsp;intrusion the amendment blocks.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Twenty-first Amendment has three\u0026nbsp;parts. Section 1 explicitly repealed the Eighteenth\u0026nbsp;Amendment and brought an end to Prohibition.\u0026nbsp;Accordingly, because many saw the Twenty-first\u0026nbsp;Amendment as nothing but a repeal of the Eighteenth\u0026nbsp;Amendment, Congress passed the resolution\u0026nbsp;without much substantive debate. Most\u0026nbsp;of the legislative debate centered on the issue of\u0026nbsp;saloons and the ratification process codified in\u0026nbsp;Section 3 of the amendment, which mandated\u0026nbsp;the use of state conventions. The amendment\u0026nbsp;was passed by the Senate on February 16, 1933,\u0026nbsp;and by the House four days later. It was the only\u0026nbsp;amendment to have been ratified by conventions\u0026nbsp;in the several states, rather than by the state legislatures.\u0026nbsp;Reportedly, Congress feared that rurally\u0026nbsp;dominated state legislatures might be more likely\u0026nbsp;to reject the repeal of Prohibition. The method\u0026nbsp;resulted in a quick ratification, and it became part\u0026nbsp;of the Constitution on December 5, 1933.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn the original resolution there was an additional\u0026nbsp;section that granted Congress and the\u0026nbsp;states \u201cconcurrent power to regulate or prohibit\u0026nbsp;the sale of intoxicating liquors to be drunk on\u0026nbsp;the premises where sold.\u201d This provision was\u0026nbsp;designed primarily to authorize the prohibition\u0026nbsp;of saloons. But members of Congress finally\u0026nbsp;agreed that such regulation belonged with the\u0026nbsp;states, and the section was removed.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESection 2 became the Twenty-first Amendment\u2019s\u0026nbsp;primary source of judicial conflict. The\u0026nbsp;question was whether the amendment gave the\u0026nbsp;states absolute control over alcohol, notwithstanding\u0026nbsp;the Commerce Clause and the Import-Export Clause, or whether the amendment\u0026nbsp;permitted the states only enough autonomy to\u0026nbsp;be dry without infringing on the scope of the rest\u0026nbsp;of the Constitution. The amendment tracks very\u0026nbsp;closely the language of a pre-Prohibition federal\u0026nbsp;statute, the Webb-Kenyon Act (1913), current\u0026nbsp;version at 27 U.S.C. \u00a7 122 (1994 ), which gave\u0026nbsp;states power to tax alcoholic beverages not only\u0026nbsp;when sold in the state, but also when sold through\u0026nbsp;the mail in interstate commerce.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAfter repeal of Prohibition, many states\u0026nbsp;enacted a three-tier distribution system in which\u0026nbsp;each tier is permitted only to sell its product to\u0026nbsp;the next licensed tier, requiring separate licensing\u0026nbsp;for each tier. Discrimination against out-of-state\u0026nbsp;liquor was often routed through the requirements\u0026nbsp;of the three-tier system.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EState Board of Equalization v. Young\u2019s Market\u0026nbsp;Co.\u003C\/em\u003E (1936) and in \u003Cem\u003EZiffrin, Inc. v. Reeves\u003C\/em\u003E (1939),\u0026nbsp;the Supreme Court originally interpreted the\u0026nbsp;Twenty-first Amendment as an absolute exception\u0026nbsp;to the Commerce Clause. However, this\u0026nbsp;changed in 1964 with a string of Twenty-first\u0026nbsp;Amendment cases. In \u003Cem\u003EHostetter v. Idlewild Bon\u0026nbsp;Voyage Liquor Corp.\u003C\/em\u003E (1964), Justice Potter Stewart,\u0026nbsp;writing for the majority, argued forcefully\u0026nbsp;that the Twenty-first Amendment was not an\u0026nbsp;absolute exception to the Commerce Clause as\u0026nbsp;far as liquor was concerned. Likewise, in \u003Cem\u003EDepartment\u0026nbsp;of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co.\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1964), the Court held that Kentucky\u2019s tax on\u0026nbsp;imported whiskey violated the Import-Export\u0026nbsp;Clause. Justice Stewart, again writing for the\u0026nbsp;majority, stated:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003ETo sustain the tax which Kentucky\u0026nbsp;has imposed in this case would\u0026nbsp;require nothing short of squarely\u0026nbsp;holding that the Twenty-first\u0026nbsp;Amendment has completely repealed\u0026nbsp;the Export-Import Clause so far as\u0026nbsp;intoxicants are concerned. Nothing\u0026nbsp;in the language of the Amendment\u0026nbsp;nor in its history leads to such\u0026nbsp;an extraordinary conclusion. This\u0026nbsp;Court has never intimated such a\u0026nbsp;view, and now that the claim for the\u0026nbsp;first time is squarely presented, we\u0026nbsp;expressly reject it.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESimilarly, in\u0026nbsp;(1971), the Court held that a Wisconsin statute\u0026nbsp;that empowered a police chief to post in all local\u0026nbsp;retail liquor outlets a notice forbidding the sale\u0026nbsp;of alcohol to the plaintiff because of his excessive\u0026nbsp;drinking, without giving the plaintiff any\u0026nbsp;advance notice or opportunity to contest it, violated\u0026nbsp;the due process requirements of the Fourteenth\u0026nbsp;Amendment.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThroughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the\u0026nbsp;Supreme Court continued to chip away at the\u0026nbsp;Twenty-first Amendment. \u003Cem\u003ESee, e.g., United States\u0026nbsp;v. Tax Commission of Mississippi\u003C\/em\u003E (1975) (holding\u0026nbsp;that the states could not tax the sale of liquor\u0026nbsp;on military bases within their borders because\u0026nbsp;the United States has concurrent jurisdiction\u0026nbsp;over military bases); \u003Cem\u003ECraig v. Boren\u003C\/em\u003E (1976) (noting\u0026nbsp;that the Twenty-first Amendment does not\u0026nbsp;override the equal-protection requirements of\u0026nbsp;the Fourteenth Amendment); \u003Cem\u003ECalifornia Retail\u0026nbsp;Liquor Dealers Ass\u2019n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1980) (finding that the Twenty-first Amendment\u0026nbsp;does not protect a state regulation that violates\u0026nbsp;the Sherman Act because of the Supremacy\u0026nbsp;Clause); \u003Cem\u003ELarkin v. Grendel\u2019s Den, Inc.\u003C\/em\u003E (1982)\u0026nbsp;(stating that the state may not exercise its powers\u0026nbsp;under the Twenty-first Amendment in a way\u0026nbsp;that impinges on the rights protected under the\u0026nbsp;Establishment Clause). In \u003Cem\u003ENew York State Liquor\u0026nbsp;Authority v. Bellanca\u003C\/em\u003E (1981), the Court allowed\u0026nbsp;a state a greater range of freedom to regulate\u0026nbsp;adult speech in connection with its power to\u0026nbsp;regulate the sale of liquor within its boundaries,\u0026nbsp;because \u201c[w]hatever artistic or communicative\u0026nbsp;value may attach to topless dancing is overcome\u0026nbsp;by the State\u2019s exercise of its broad power under\u0026nbsp;the Twenty-first Amendment\u201d). But in \u003Cem\u003E44 Liquormart,\u0026nbsp;Inc. v. Rhode Island\u003C\/em\u003E (1996), the Court held\u0026nbsp;that Rhode Island\u2019s prohibition against certain\u0026nbsp;advertisements stating the prices of liquor was\u0026nbsp;an abridgment of the First Amendment\u2019s protection\u0026nbsp;of free speech. Although the lengthy decision\u0026nbsp;contained several concurring opinions, all nine\u0026nbsp;justices agreed that the Rhode Island law was not\u0026nbsp;saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. For the\u0026nbsp;majority, Justice John Paul Stevens stated, \u201c[W]e\u0026nbsp;now hold that the Twenty-First Amendment does\u0026nbsp;not qualify the constitutional prohibition against\u0026nbsp;laws abridging the freedom of speech embodied\u0026nbsp;in the First Amendment.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003ECapital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp\u003C\/em\u003E (1984),\u0026nbsp;the Court finally articulated a balancing test to\u0026nbsp;determine when the state\u2019s powers under the\u0026nbsp;Twenty-first Amendment trump the Commerce\u0026nbsp;Clause:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003EIn such a case, the central question\u0026nbsp;is whether the interests implicated\u0026nbsp;by a state regulation are so closely\u0026nbsp;related to the powers reserved by\u0026nbsp;the Amendment that the regulation\u0026nbsp;may prevail, even though its requirements\u0026nbsp;directly conflict with express\u0026nbsp;federal policies.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EApplying this balancing test in \u003Cem\u003EBacchus\u0026nbsp;Imports, Ltd. v. Dias\u003C\/em\u003E (1984), the Court struck\u0026nbsp;down a Hawaiian tax law that favored certain\u0026nbsp;liquors that were only manufactured locally\u0026nbsp;because \u201c[s]tate laws that constitute mere economic\u0026nbsp;protectionism are . . . not entitled to the\u0026nbsp;same deference as laws enacted to combat the\u0026nbsp;perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in\u0026nbsp;liquor.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003E324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy\u003C\/em\u003E (1987), the\u0026nbsp;Court balanced the state\u2019s virtually complete\u0026nbsp;control over the liquor distribution system\u0026nbsp;within its borders against the policy behind the\u0026nbsp;Sherman Antitrust Act and found the latter of\u0026nbsp;more weight. In a sharp dissent, Justice Sandra\u0026nbsp;Day O\u2019Connor, joined by Chief Justice William\u0026nbsp;H. Rehnquist, rejected the majority\u2019s conclusion.\u0026nbsp;The dissent described in detail the legislative\u0026nbsp;history and the subsequent state practices to\u0026nbsp;show that the amendment was designed to give\u0026nbsp;the states absolute control over the manufacturing\u0026nbsp;and distribution of liquor within their\u0026nbsp;borders. The \u201cSenate discussions,\u201d she wrote,\u0026nbsp;\u201cclearly demonstrate an intent to confer on\u0026nbsp;States complete and exclusive control over the\u0026nbsp;commerce of liquor.\u201d The states understood the\u0026nbsp;meaning as well. Immediately after the ratification\u0026nbsp;of the Twenty-first Amendment, states\u0026nbsp;enacted strong price-control measures, \u201cthe\u0026nbsp;very type of statute that this Court strikes down\u0026nbsp;today.\u201d The majority opinion answered Justice\u0026nbsp;O\u2019Connor\u2019s argument with a one-paragraph\u0026nbsp;footnote that focused on maintaining federal\u0026nbsp;economic power through the Commerce Clause\u0026nbsp;and the Antitrust Laws.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThat same year in \u003Cem\u003ESouth Dakota v. Dole\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;(1987), the Court held that Congress could use its\u0026nbsp;spending power to regulate interstate commerce\u0026nbsp;indirectly with regard to intoxicating liquors. In\u0026nbsp;Dole, Congress made certain highway funding\u0026nbsp;contingent upon a state\u2019s acceptance of a minimum\u0026nbsp;drinking age of twenty-one years. Justice\u0026nbsp;O\u2019Connor and Justice William J. Brennan Jr. each\u0026nbsp;filed dissents, with Brennan arguing that the\u0026nbsp;Twenty-first Amendment limited the spending\u0026nbsp;power.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Supreme Court last addressed the\u0026nbsp;Twenty-first Amendment in the case \u003Cem\u003EGranholm v.\u0026nbsp;Heald\u003C\/em\u003E (2005). The Court reiterated its prior holdings\u0026nbsp;that the Twenty-first Amendment does not\u0026nbsp;protect state laws that violate the First Amendment\u2019s\u0026nbsp;Free Speech Clause, the Establishment\u0026nbsp;Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Due\u0026nbsp;Process Clause, and the Import-Export Clause.\u0026nbsp;The Court also reaffirmed its decision in \u003Cem\u003EBacchus\u003C\/em\u003E\u0026nbsp;that \u201cforecloses any contention that \u00a7 2 of the\u0026nbsp;Twenty-first Amendment immunizes discriminatory\u0026nbsp;direct-shipment laws from Commerce\u0026nbsp;Clause scrutiny.\u201d Justice Clarence Thomas wrote\u0026nbsp;a detailed dissent, arguing that the text and history\u0026nbsp;of the Twenty-first Amendment make clear\u0026nbsp;that there is no \u201cnegative Commerce Clause barrier\u0026nbsp;to state regulation of liquor sales to in-state\u0026nbsp;consumers.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAfter a number of years in which the\u0026nbsp;Supreme Court pruned state powers under the\u0026nbsp;Twenty-first Amendment, the amendment now\u0026nbsp;leaves a state with the power to become dry if it\u0026nbsp;chooses and to control to some extent the distribution\u0026nbsp;and sales system of alcohol within its\u0026nbsp;borders. The three-tier system remains intact in\u0026nbsp;many states, and \u003Cem\u003EGranholm\u003C\/em\u003E affirmed its legitimacy.\u0026nbsp;But lower courts have divided on the extent\u0026nbsp;to which state licensing requirements among the\u0026nbsp;tiers can constitutionally restrict interstate trade\u0026nbsp;in liquor and wine.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/David_Wagner.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.regent.edu\/acad\/schlaw\/faculty_staff\/wagner.cfm\u0022\u003EDavid Wagner\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/h4\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n Professor, Regent University School of Law\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000182-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000182-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000182-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000182-taba\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEdward Behr, Prohibition: Thirteen Years that Changed America (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDuncan Baird Douglass, \u003Ci\u003EConstitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages\u003C\/i\u003E, 49 Duke L.J. 1619 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJohn Foust, \u003Ci\u003EState Power to Regulate Alcohol Under the Twenty-first Amendment: The Constitutional Implications of the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act\u003C\/i\u003E, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 659 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EElyse Grossman and James F. Mosher,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EPublic Health, State Alcohol Pricing Policies, and the Dismantling of the 21st Amendment: A Legal Analysis\u003C\/em\u003E, 15 Mich. St. U. J. Med. \u0026amp; Law 177 (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJohn Kobler, Ardent Spirits: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition (reprint 1993)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESusan Lorde Martin, \u003Ci\u003EWine Wars\u2014Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-first Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and Consumers\u0027 Rights\u003C\/i\u003E, 38 Am. Business L.J. 1 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERuss Miller, \u003Ci\u003EThe Wine Is in the Mail: the Twenty-first Amendment and State Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages\u003C\/i\u003E, 54 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 2495 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThomas R. Pegram, Battling Demon Rum: The Struggle for a Dry America, 1800\u20131933 (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJonathan M. rotter \u0026amp; Joshua S. Stambaugh,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EWhat\u0027s Left of the Twenty-First Amendment?,\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/em\u003E6 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol\u0027y \u0026amp; Ethics J. 601 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJames Alexander Tanford,\u0026nbsp;\u003Cem\u003EE-Commerce in Wine\u003C\/em\u003E, 3 J. L. Econ. \u0026amp; Pol\u0027y 275 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000182-tabb\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EState Board of Equalization v. Young\u0027s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJoseph S. Finch \u0026amp; Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EZiffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDepartment of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECalifornia v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Tax Commission of Mississippi, 421 U.S. 599 (1975)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECraig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECalifornia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass\u0027n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENew York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELarkin v. Grendel\u0027s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECapital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESouth Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENorth Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGranholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBrooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EArnold\u0027s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000182-tabc\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000036\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECommerce with Foreign Nations\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000037\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECommerce Among the States\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000073\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EImport-Export Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]