[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_rZjCmUBEHftE91DeNru5KqLSSaOmvYzpnCjBdzKdLqM.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000029","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/30\/origination-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EOrigination Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n Article I, Section 7, Clause 1\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EConsistent with the English requirement that money bills must commence in the House of Commons, the Framers expected that the Origination Clause would ensure that \u201cpower over the purse\u201d would lie with the legislative body closer to the people. Under the Articles of Confederation, the national government could not tax individuals, and the Origination Clause was one of several provisions meant to cabin the national revenue power created under the Constitution. The clause was also part of a critical compromise between large and small states, helping to temper the large states\u2019 unhappiness with equal representation in the Senate by leaving the power to initiate tax bills with the House of Representatives, where the large states had greater influence.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe final version of the clause was much weaker than the form proposed by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, which would have required all \u201cmoney bills\u201d (including appropriations) to originate in the House and would have given the Senate no power to amend. Gerry feared that the Senate would become an aristocratic body because of its small size, its selection by legislatures rather than by election, and its six year term of office. \u201cIt was a maxim,\u201d he said, \u201cthat the people ought to hold the purse-strings.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe strongest proponents of national power opposed the clause in any form. As James Wilson of Pennsylvania explained at the Constitutional Convention, \u201cIf both branches were to say yes or no, it was of little consequence which should say yes or no first.\u201d What survived the contentious debates was closer to Wilson\u2019s vision than to Gerry\u2019s. The clause was restricted to bills for raising revenue, and the Senate was given the amendment power (which, Gerry thought, gutted the provision of any real effect).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EEven in weakened form, however, the Origination Clause was not meaningless. James Madison, no supporter of the clause at the Convention, gave it a generous interpretation in \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E No. 58: \u201cThe House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of the government.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs it turned out, the Origination Clause has had little effect. For one thing, many revenue bills have their intellectual genesis in the Treasury Department, not in Congress. Furthermore, Elbridge Gerry\u2019s fears were well founded: the Senate\u2019s power to amend is generally understood in practice to be so broad that the Senate can replace the entire text of a bill that technically originates in the House.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe understanding that the clause is a nullity reflects practice, however, not doctrine. In its most recent Origination Clause case, \u003Ci\u003EUnited States\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ev. Munoz-Flores \u003C\/i\u003E(1990), a divided Supreme Court\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Erejected the argument that origination issues are nonjusticiable political questions. The Court held that a plaintiff with standing may pursue a claim that a revenue statute improperly originated in the Senate. In \u003Ci\u003EMunoz-Flores\u003C\/i\u003E, however, the Court did not reach the larger issues, concluding that a bill to impose a user\u2019s fee, where raising revenue was a secondary concern, was not a \u201cbill for raising revenue.\u201d The Supreme Court has affirmed that, consistent with Congress\u2019s \u201cuniform action,\u201d the term \u201cbills for raising revenue\u201d is \u201cconfined to bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the words, and has not been understood to extend to bills for other purposes which incidentally create revenue.\u201d \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Norton \u003C\/i\u003E(1875). That distinction is\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ean easier one to state than to apply, however. The Supreme Court\u2019s decision in \u003Ci\u003ENational Federation of\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EIndependent Business v. Sebelius \u003C\/i\u003E(2012)\u2014namely,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ethat the so-called individual mandate penalty, applicable to those who after 2014 do not acquire health insurance, will really be a tax\u2014illustrates the categorization difficulties. The issue in \u003Ci\u003ENFIB\u003C\/i\u003E was not the Origination Clause, of course, but the result in the case may have many spillover effects.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe larger issues await another case where a taxpayer subject to an unquestioned revenue statute can raise serious questions about the statute\u2019s origin.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/law.case.edu\/OurSchool\/FacultyStaff\/MeetOurFaculty\/FacultyDetail.aspx?id=118\u0022\u003EErik M. Jensen\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/h4\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n Schott-van den Eyden Professor, Case Western Reserve University Law School\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000029-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000029-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000029-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000029-taba\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000029-tabb\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566 (1875)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMillard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENational Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000029-tabc\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000033\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESpending Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000030\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPresentment Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]